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ABSTRACT 
In a recent paper, Weitzman [1979) described a policy of 
''optimal search for the best alternative. '' The present paper is 
concerned with the development and characterization of a policy of 
''Nash equilibrium search for the best alternative, '' Specifically, it 
is shown that, under certain monotonicity assumptions, and under the 
assumption that firms have incomplete information regarding the 
results of rivals' search behavior, a Nash equilibrium search policy 
exists and has the same form as Weitzman' a optimal search policy. 
NASH JnUILIBRIUM SEARCH FOR nrn BEST ALTERNATIVE 
Jennifer F, Reinganum1 
I, INTRODUCTION 
In a recent paper, Weitzman [1979] described a policy of 
' ' optimal search for the best alternative. ••2 The present paper is 
concerned with the development and characterization of a policy of 
'' Nash equilibrium search for the best alternative, '' Specifically, 
it is shown that, under certain monotonicity assumptions, and under 
the assumption that firms have incomplete information regarding the 
results of rivals' search behavior, a Nash equilibrium search policy 
exists and has the same form as Weitzman' a optimal search policy. 
Thia paper generalizes the results of an earlier paper 
[Reinganum 1980], and illustrates another application of strategic 
search theory, The model is applied to the problem of strategically 
developing drilling or mining sites for the purpose of subsequent 
resource extraction, 
II, THE JM>DBL 
The model is developed in the context of two distinct phases 
-- a site evaluation phase followed by an extraction phase, Suppose 
that each of M firms holds title to a geographical region believed to 
contain deposits of a natural resource, This region may be divided 
into a number of potential drill or excavation sites, Bach firm's 
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deposit may be irregularly distributed beneath the ground, so that the 
amount of resource which is recoverable from any given site may vary 
from site to site. It is assumed to be prohibitively expensive to 
sink more than one shaft to extract the resource reserves of the 
region, However, less dramatic procedures such as core samples or 
surface examination of sites can be done at more moderate expense. 
This process of ascertaining, for each site, the amount of the 
resource deposit which is recoverable if access is from that site, is 
termed site eyaluation. Site evaluation is assumed to occur 
essentially instantaneously before extraction begins, and determines 
the initial stocks of recoverable reserves for the extraction phase, 
Bach firm must evaluate and develop its own resource deposit in 
ignorance of the exploratory behavior of its rivals, However, each 
firm can foresee the manner in which the resource stocks will be 
depleted once extraction has begun. Specifically, we assume that 
extraction occurs in a Nash equilibrium fashion over a known time 
horizon (possibly infinite), given the initial stocks determined in 
the previous phase, Let (y1,, , , ,yM) denote the M firms' eventual 
recoverable resource stocks, 
Assumption 1, The value of ym to firm m under Nash equilibrium 
extraction is denoted um(y1 ,, , , ,yM), where um is nonnegative, jointly 
continuous in all its arguments and twice differentiable with 
2 oum/oym) O, and a um/oymoyk < 0, for k,m c 1,2,, , , ,M, 
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That is, we assume that an increase in m's own resource stock 
increases the present value of m's profits; moreover, an increase in 
m's own stock or in any rival's stock decreases the marginal value to 
m of an increase in y ,3 This valuation is assumed to include the m 
costs of sinking the access shaft via which the resource will be 
extracted. 
Each firm m holds a geographical region containing a known
amount of resource, denoted � • Thia region is assumed to be divided m 
into f ini toly many potential drill or excavation sites. The number ot" 
aitoa for firm 11 h denoted n and m's sites are indexed bym 
i 8 Im• {1,2,. ,,,n11}. An evaluation of firm m's ith site consists of
a surface examination or core sample, which results in the observation 
of x11i' which ropro1ent1 the amount of the resource deposit which is 
rocovorablo if acce11 to tho deposit is gained from site i. Since the 
firm doesn't know precisely which sites are associated with the 
highoat levels of recoverable reserves, the quantities xmi are random 
variables. Let F11i(x )  denote the probability that xmi i x, for 
x B [�,;ml' Let F11i
(x) be continuous and strictly incre�sing in x 
with a continuous density fmi(x ). Note that xmi and xmi' are 
independent random variables for all i, i' s Im, and for a!l m. A 
coat of cmi is required to ascertain the value of xmi' 
Each firm must decide the order in which to explore its sites 
and when to cease exploration and settle upon an extraction site, 
Moreover, we assume that firm m cannot observe the exploratory 
behavior of its rivals or the results of its rivals' sito evaluations 
(i, e, , the realizations of rival firms' levels of recoverable reserves 
from each of their sites ), Thus the firm's information at any stage 
consists of its own remaining sites, its most promising site observed 
to date and the level of reserves recoverable from that site, 
Partition I into two sets. Defino m 
Sm = {i s Im I i has been evaluated}, and Sm = Im - Sm' tho unexamined 
sites. Since all xmi are independent, the values ot" x11i are 
unimportant; it is only ym, tho maximum of those xmi'' ob�erved to
date, which matters. Thus tho firm's state variable• aro (Sll,ym).
Firm m must choose a selection rule describing which aito to explore
next, and a stopping rule which specifies whether to continue or cease 
exploration if the current state is (S ,y ), Let rJ4 denote the setm II 
Definition 1. A selection rule for firm m is a mapping 
m - nm -
Pm : P x [�,xml -> [0,1] where Pmi(Sm,ym) is the probability that 
firm m will examine site i a Im next if (Sm,ym) is the current state.
Thus 0 i pmi(•,•) i 1 with l_ Pmi(Sm,ym) = 1 for all 
iaS m 
Definition 2, A stopping rule for firm m is a mapping 
n � x [� ,; ] -> [0,1], where n (S ,y ) denotes tho probability m m m m m m 
that firm m will examine another site when the current state is 
Definition 3. A strategy for firm m consists of a pair (pm,nm) of a 
1oloction rulo and a stopping rulo for m. 
For compactness of notation, let am = (pm, nm) and
am = (a1,,,,am-l'amtl''''aH)' Thus (am,am) is a complete list of 
stratogios for tho H firms, whilo a lists only thoso of m's rivals. m 
III, NASH OOUILIBRIUM 
Sinco firm m cannot obsorvo tho outcomes of its rivals' sito 
s 
examinations and evaluations, and is assumed to tako tho rival 
strategy vector am as given, we can define Um(ym,am) = B;J [um(ym,ym)], m 
whoro the oxpoctation is taken with respect to the distribution of y m 
which is induced by tho strategies am, Note that Um(ym,am) inherits 
tho property that aum/aym > 0 from tho assumption that aum/aym > o. 
Defino O (S ,y ,a ) to bo tho expected value to m of m m m m 
continuing optimally from (S ,y ) on, when m's riyals play tho m m 
stratuios a . m 
Om(Sm,ym,am) = max {Um(ym,am)' ma� {-cmi + Om(Sm- {i},ym,am)Fmi(ym) 
iaS m 
(1) 
whero 0 (0,y ,a ) - U (y ,a ), m m m m m m 
Definition 4. A strategy am for which equation (1) holds is a l!.l!..!1 
response for m to tho rivals' strategies a . m 
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Note that m's selection rule is determined by tho maximization 
inside the outer brackets, while m's stopping rulo is dotormined by 
the maximization outside tho outer brackets, 
Assumption 2. Suppose that for each a thoro exists some i a I suchm m 
that 
m = 1,2, . .  .,H,4 
Assumption 2 states that before any aito evaluation is 
conducted, tho expected marginal contribution to firm m's profits duo 
to examining a site excooda tho coat of examining that sito, 
regardless of the resource stocks hold by tho other firms, for at 
least one of m's sitos; moreover, this is assumed to hold for all 
firms m. This assumption rules out the possibility that no sito 
examination and evaluation is a best rosponso to some strategy a ; atm 
least ono sito will bo examined by each firm, and oach firm will 
exploit its resource deposit. 
Definition S. Define firm m's contingent reseryation stock for site 
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( 2) 
To see that 6 i(� ) exists and is unique, note that H i(� .� ) < 0 for m m m m m 
all am), and aumi(6,�m)/86 < 0 by tho fact that um is increasing in
Ym· Thus either Hmi(.&m,�m) i O, in which case 6mi(�m) = .&m• or 
Hm1(.&m,�m) > O, in which case 6mi(�m) is uniquely defined by 
Proposition 1. A best response for firm m to the rival strategy 
vector all exists and has tho following form.
1 
pmi (Sii, ym) = 1 
-
0 
whore 
2_ 
if iaS m and 6 i (� ) m m 
Pmi' (Sm' ym) if 
i'sS ' m 
otherwise 
> 6mj(�m) for all 
i 8 S I m 
jeS m 
s I = (i' ,i' 'sSm 0mi' (�m) "' 0mi' '(�m) > 0mj (�m) for all j e Sm' j"' i' ,i"}, m 
and 
1 
[0,1] 
0 
if ym = 6mi(�m) for some i B Sm• 
otherwise 
Proof : Application of Weitzman's [1979] results to the problem 01 
finding a best response for m to a implies that the strategy above i8 m 
a best response for m. 
Q. E. D. 
We can characterize the best response rule verbally as 
follows, 
Selection Rule; Given a strategy vector for 111s rivals, am, firm m 
should examine next that site which has the highest oontingont 
reservation stock; if there is a tie, firm m may select any
randomization over the tying sites, 
Stopping Rulo; Firm m should cease exploration as soon as current 
reserves exceed tho contingent reservation stock of tho next site 
selected (and consequently, of every remaining site), 
Assumption 3. Suppose that for each m and all i,i' a 111, tho 
following statements are true: if i > i' , then 
(b )  cmi l cmi' • 
That is, sites which are more costly to examine and evaluate 
are also more likely to yield lower levels of recoverable resources, 
This is consistent with the interpretation that more oostly sites are 
less accessible; lower accessibility would also tend to make 
extraction of the deposit through that site more difficult, This 
monotonicity assumption allows us to further simplify the selection 
rule, 
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Sinoe H i(p,a ) is non-decreasing in i under Assumption 3 ,m m 
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firm m's oontingent reservation stocks can be ordered as follows: if 
i > i', then 6 i,(a) 1 6 i(a ); moreover, this is true for all m m m m 
Thus firm m simply examines its sites in the order 1,2,,, ,,nm' 
ruard leu of the riyals' s trategies. 
Thus we have shown that under assumptions 1-3 ,  .ii a Nash 
equilibrium exists, it is in strategies of the following form: 
firm m selects nm (non-contingent ) reservation s tocks 
and stops explorina after Nm sites, where 
N = min {i 8 I I x i le i}. 11 m m m 
ThUS firm m's atrategy can be fully char acterized by em 8 DID"'-
Definition 6, Redefine a s trategy for firm m to be a reservation cost 
vector Cm a Dm' 
Definition 7, Redefine a best response for firm m to em to be pm(em>' 
where 6 1<t ) = min (6 a [x .�] I H i(6,t ) i 0}, where m m 111 m m m 
x 
Hmi(6,tm> = �[Um(xmi'tm> - Um(6,tm)]fmi(xmi)dxmi - 0mi' 
and Um(ym,tm> = � [um(ym,ym)J, where the expectation is taken with m 
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respect to the distribution of ym which is induced by the reservation 
stocks �m' (These distributions are calculated explicitly in the 
Appendix), 
The following result is proven in the Appendix, 
Proposition 2, The functions Um(ym,tm>' Hmi(6,tm> and 6mi<em> are 
jointly continuous in all their arguments, 
Proposition 3 .  If 6 ice ) > x , then 6 i<e ) is a docreasing functionm m 111 m m 
of tm' 
Proof: 
_, -
Note that if Cm l Cm wit� r.'rict inequality in at least one 
- -· -
component, then ym is stochastically greater under em than under em. 
_, - - _, Thus Um(Ym•tm) = Et
,[um(Ym•Ym)J < Eem
[um(ym,y•)J = Um(Ym•tm),
m 
-· - 2 Moreover, 3Um(Ym•�m)/3ym < aUm(ym,tm)/aym because a um/aymayk < 0 and 
_, -yk is stochastically greater for some k under em than under Cm· This 
in turn implies that Hmi is decreasing in tm' Recall that Hmi it also 
decreasing in 6. To maintain the equality Hmi(pmi<em>'tm> = 0 in the 
face of an increase in tm' it must be that 6mi<em> decreases, If 
6mi<em> = Am• then it is unaffected by a marginal ohange in tm' 
Q, E,D. 
Definition 8 ,  An ff-vector of strategies t• 
Proposition 4. There exists a Nash equilibrium t• s D1 x D2 x•• • x Dy• 
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Proof: Notice that 6m<em> s Dm due to Assumption 3, Define the 
vector mapping i:D 1 x D2 �··· x DM -> D 1 x D2 X••• x DM by 
- J{ i(�) 
= 
(omi(�m))isI }m=l' i is continuous in �
 while 
m 
D 1 x D2 x••• x DM is compact, convex and nonempty. Therefore 
Brouwor11 fixed-point theorem assures us that i ha1 a fixed point �· 
. -· 
Such a point has the property that �m = 
6
m(�m
)' 
m = 1,2, •• , ,M, and thus constitutes a Nash equilibrium. 
Q, E,D, 
IV. smm LIMITATIONS 
Weitzman (1979] di1cu11e1 a list of perturbations of the basic 
model to which his optimal search rule is not robuat. In addition to 
this 1 iat,. the equilibrium model developed above is send tivo to 
1overal other a1poct1 of the problem which are not encountered in tho 
single-agent model. For instance, if we relax Assumption 3, tho 
monotonicity assumption, this causes no difficulty in the single-agent 
caao. However, in tho game described above, the following difficulty 
arises, Lot ?m s Dm denote m's rivals' strategies. Then 6m<em> is 
woll-def inod but not continuous in ? , To see this, notice that a m 
small change in ? m may result in a different sampling order for some 
firm k � m, since the order of sampling is dependent on the ranking of 
(�ki)iaI • At the point at which k's ordering switches, although firm k 
k is indifferent between the orderings (since both have the same 
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reservations stocks at the switchpoint), firm m is not indifferent to 
k's sampling order (unless Fki is the same for all i s  Ik for all 
firms k), Thus unless the firms' sites differ only in their 
examination coats and not in their distribution functions, the 
function U (o,� ) is sensitive to tho rivals' sampling orders and thus m m 
oxporioncos a discontinuity at any point ? at which a rival changes m 
tho order in which it evaluates its �ites. It may be po11iblo to 
prove the existence of an equilibrium of this sort if we expand the 
strategy apace for m to be the set of distribution functions over 
- nm 
�· xm] , 10 that a random sot of reservation 1tock1 is drawn; this 
in turn implies an ordering of the 1ito1, Ono may be able to prove 
that a Nash equilibrium in these distribution functions exists, but 
the existence of such an equilibrium would be considerably moro 
difficult to establish. 
Finally, tho result that the Nash equilibrium rule is of tho 
same form as Weitzman' s optimal search rule ii extremely 1onsi tivo to 
tho assumption that tho firms have incomplete information, That is, 
it is essential that the firms act in ignorance of their opponent's 
realizations and with full knowledge of their own, In the context of 
this application, this informational assumption seems quite 
reasonable. However, it is not reasonable in all contexts and this 
result should not be expected to hold up under alternative 
informational assumptions, 
APPENDIX 
The proof of Proposition 2 will rely upon the following 
results from analysis. Define a measure space (I, p,µ). For our 
purposes, X i1 a compact, convex, nonempty subset of RM-l and µ is 
Lebesgue product measure. 
Claim 1, If fn -> f in L
1(µ) and <sn> is a sequence of measurable
functions such that lsnl i M, all n, and gn -> g almost everywhere 
(µ), then &nfn -> gf in L
1(µ), 
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Claim 2, Suppose f(t,x) ia defined on a compact 1ub1et TxX e RM, If 
f ia a measurable function of x for each t and a continuous function 
of t for each x, then h(t )  = /f(t,x)dµ(x )  is a continuous function of 
t. 
The sta tem�nta of these results for Xe R1 can be found in Royden
(1!168, p, 119 and 91, respectively]; the extensions to Xe RM-
l are 
straightforward, 
Proof of Proposition 2. Define 
Gki(ak;tk ) = Pr (xkN i ak,Nk = i I tk}. Direct computation and k 
simplification of these probabilities yields 
• 
{ :u<•.> 
and, for i 2. 2, 
0 
i i 
1T FkJ<ak> - 1T FkJ<eki> j=l Jcl 
�l i 
� 
FkJ<ek (i-1>>Fki<ak> - 1T FkJ<eki> J=l . J=l 
0 
. i 
2 Tf.fkJ(ak)Fkt (ak) Jal t�J 
i-1 
1T FkJ<eki>fki<ak> Jal 
n Let ek be a sequence of vectors from Dk, which converges to 
Define 
i-1 
i 
ITJ. fkj ( ak)Fkt (ak)I n n (ak) 
"r ceu.tk(i-1)1 
+ 1T Fkj<t:i)fki(ak)I n - (ak) J=l (tk (i-l)'xk] 
where I(•) is an indicator function, Note that s:i is uniformly 
bounded since laki(ak,tki)I i Hi._= l max fki(ak ) for all isl -k aks[,1.k,xk] 
(ak,tk ) s [,1.k,;k] x Dk because the densities fki(•) are continuous on 
compact domains and are thus bounded by their maximum values, 
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n Moroovor, S;i convorsoa pointwiao to ski since 
1S 
Rocail that am a Ca1,,,,am-l 'am+ l ''''aM); tm ia si
milarly dofinod.
Defino Gk(ak;ek> = l Gki(ak;ek>' and Gm(am;tm> = !ImGk(ak;ek>' Thia islk a.r 
ia tho joint distribution of y by tho independence of all the random m 
variables, Denote the joint density by g (a ;t ), Then m m m 
-n - - -n - -n s as (a ;e ) ia uniformly bounded by I I  M, and s converses m m m m �-lt m 
i i -n -po ntw ao to im •• n -> m (i,e,, 81 em -> em>· 
Since u (y ,a ) is continuous in y for oach Ym• m m m m 
/um(y:,am)dµ(am) -> /um(ym,am)dµ(am) as n -> m [Claim 2], Thus 
n n- - 1 um• um(Ym••m) -> um(Ym••m) =um in L (µ), 
N 
-n <un> ow associate our sequences <sm> and m with Claim l 's <s-n> 
That is, 
as n -> m, But /u (y ,a >i (a ;t )dµ(a ) is what was previously m m m m m m m 
detined as U (y .� ) , Thus m m m 
Un = U (yn �n) -) U (y .� ) = U as n -) m, m m m' "m m m "m ID 
Alternatively put, U (y ,e) is jointly continuous in (y .� ) , The m m m m m 
function Hmi inh erits joint continuity from Um and, finally, pmi(tm) 
innerits continuity from Hmi' 
16 
Q,E,D, 
FOOTNOTES 
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Border and Bd Green for their auhtance, The financial support of 
the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged, 
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2,  Notation is consistent with Weitzman' a wherever possible so as to 
make apparent the applicability of his results to the problem at hand, 
Research on problems related to those studied by Weitzman has been. 
done by Bellman (1975], Kadane (1969], De Groot [1970], Stone [1975], 
Kadane and Simon (1977] and Spulber [197 9], 
3, Models of oligopolistic resource extraction can be found in Lewis 
and Schmalensee [1980a,b], Loury (1980], and Salant (1979], No 
re1ult1 pertaining to Aasumption 1 are available from these studies, 
In another.model, Stokey (1981] compute& the Nash equilibri11111 in a 
model with a constant elaaticity demand fun ction and no extraction 
coats, In this caae, the Nash equilibri11111 profit function for m, 
given the initial stocks (y1, • • •  ,yK), is easily shown to possess the 
properties discussed in A1111111ption 1, 
4, A sufficient condition for Ass11111ption 2 to hold is that there 
exist some i a I for which m 
for all ym, In an earlier model (Reingan11111 [1982]), 
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which is simpler than this one in most respects, Nash equilibri11111 i1 
shown to exist without assuming the equivalent of Assumption 2, 
Without Ass11111ption 2, the distributions of rival firms' ultimate stock 
levels may be spikes at zero, rather than smooth di1tribution1, This 
introduces a discontinuity in the best response functions, 
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